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Section 1: Paper 5 
Painful Virtue, Marginalisation, and Resistance 
Jordan Joseph Wadden 
University of British Columbia 
Abstract: This paper argues a potentially controversial thesis in virtue ethics, i.e., in situations of oppression and 
marginalisation, it is better to be a person of atypical virtue, one who has struggled to resist oppressive circumstances, 
than it is to be a traditionally defined virtuous agent. As such, those who have been through a tragic dilemma (or 
several) are more important for successful resistance movements than their traditionally defined counterparts. This 
paper does not romanticise oppressive situations or their influence on some individuals developing virtuous actions 
and behaviours. Instead, it acknowledges that these are tragic circumstances that permanently affect some individuals 
for the rest of their lives. However, the argument here is that these individuals can utilise their experiences as reasons 
to continue resisting until a time comes where future generations will not need to experience such tragic circumstances. 
To demonstrate the applicability of this argument, this paper will consider the struggles of queer individuals in a 
Canadian context. This is achieved by demonstrating how those individuals who led the fight for queer rights used 
their experiences of marginalisation in early resistance movements. It then shifts focus to address current issues in 
Canadian queer lives. 
 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps controversially for research in virtue ethics, I believe that there is no way we can 
fully escape pain when pursuing the virtues. This makes sense to me since some virtues may 
conflict with each other.1 However, an implication of this view is that I do not believe that the 
ideal life of virtue is a feasible goal; this is not to say that no one has achieved it yet, but rather 
the stronger claim that it could not exist. As critical as this sounds, I do not believe that we 
should forego the pursuit of the virtues, as this branch of ethics solves many problems the other 
schools cannot address. In this paper, I discuss Lisa Tessman’s concept of burdened virtues 
and then map an application onto Canadian queer protest and the fight for queer rights in the 
past few decades. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how building atypical virtue is a 
more realistic pursuit, and one that better serves society, than that of striving for a life of pure 
virtue. 
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 For those unfamiliar with virtue ethics, Aristotle described virtue as “a state of character 
concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us […]. Now it is a mean between 
two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect”.2 Aristotle continues 
by noting that this creates three dispositions, two vices and one virtue, where all three are in 
opposition with each other.3 These oppositions are not equal in degree, as one extreme will be 
more vicious than the other.4 Additionally, finding the mean is difficult. Aristotle asserts “in 
everything it is no easy task to find the middle […] but to do this to the right person, to the right 
extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone”.5 In 
this sense, there is no method through which we can codify virtue, and every situation must be 
independently assessed from the perspective of an individual with a virtuous disposition.  
 A final piece of introduction is a clear definition of what I am referring to when using the 
terms “person of atypical virtue” and a “virtuous agent” throughout this paper. The former I take 
from Aristotle’s definition of the continent individual, while the latter comes from his definition 
of the temperate individual. Essentially, while the temperate individual will always act in a 
virtuous manner without need for deliberation6, the continent individual must wrestle with their 
decisions and can sometimes act inappropriately.7 From this, I will be operating with the following 
two definitions in mind: 
Virtuous Agent: An individual who operates under ideal decision-
making conditions, not hindered by the negative effects brought 
about through struggle or poor moral luck. 
and, 
Person of Atypical Virtue: An individual who operates under non-
ideal decision-making conditions, who must wrestle with the 
negative effects brought about though struggle and/or poor moral 
luck. 
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Anyone who falls into the category of ‘virtuous agent’ will have lived a life without what I call 
“moral scarring”, and thus has easy access to discovering the virtuous mean in any situation. Moral 
scarring is the long-term effect of tragic or difficult situations which persist in future moral 
decisions an agent may make. For example, if people must make the decision between stealing 
bread to feed their family, and not stealing because doing so would harm another family, they will 
be morally scarred no matter what their decision is. 
I find the category ‘virtuous agents’ to be unrealistic, as nearly everyone has experienced 
something negative (the death of a family member, a missed promotion at work, etc.). This is the 
reason my definition includes that these virtuous agents have not been hindered, as these negative 
events have not significantly altered how virtuous agents live their lives. In contrast, anyone who 
possesses atypical virtue will have dealt with negative circumstances in some form of struggle. 
This can include many kinds of events, including: rape, racial injustice, ableism, anti-queer 
treatment, etc. These circumstances will influence, either explicitly or implicitly, how they 
experience the world for the rest of their lives. As the struggle against oppression plays out in non-
ideal settings, where in many cases all courses of action negatively impact an individual in some 
way, these persons of atypical virtue are capable of addressing tough decisions that virtuous agents 
cannot. This is because persons of atypical virtue can use their tragic experiences to inform their 
decision-making – an element that traditionally-described virtuous agents lack.  
2. Painful, Burdened Virtues 
 In non-ideal circumstances, there is a need for what Tessman refers to as “burdened 
virtues”. She defines these virtues as “all those traits that make a contribution to human flourishing-
-if they succeed in doing so at all--only because they enable survival of or resistance to oppression 
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[…] while in other ways they detract from their bearer’s well-being, in some cases so deeply that 
their bearer may be said to lead a wretched life.”8 Protests and social movements against oppressive 
regimes, institutions, and customs involve restructuring one’s own worldview in light of the pains 
of the oppressed (pains that one has not experienced); or, if one is the oppressed individual oneself, 
participation in movements will involve shedding light upon one’s own pains. Doing so expresses 
the urgency of the problem, identifies the oppressors, and viscerally demonstrates the realities of 
the oppressed. However, in so doing the socially conscious are unable to lead the traditionally 
conceived life of happiness. This is because there is a lot wrong in contemporary society that 
requires attention. Making progress in oppressive sexism alone will not make significant social 
gains if there is still institutional racism, ageism, ableism, etc.9 If this seems tough to accept, it is 
because we like to conceive of these institutionalised -isms as distinct, isolated problems. The 
reality is that they are intricately intertwined. For example, if we were to claim to be able to 
imagine a world where ageism is entirely eradicated, we would be fundamentally missing the role 
that sexism and ableism play in society’s conception of age. The non-ideal circumstances we live 
in are such that we cannot work on social issues in isolation. 
 To have a system of virtues that benefits persons of atypical virtue in their resistance to 
systemic injustices, we will inevitably need to argue for a strange set of virtues. This is because 
under non-ideal circumstances, those virtues traditionally conceived as Aristotelian may not be 
enough for survival, let alone flourishing. In discussing this subject, Cheshire Calhoun states that 
“not only is virtue sometimes exceedingly costly under non-ideal conditions but the ‘virtues’ that 
one must cultivate in order to resist or survive oppression--or example unyielding anger at 
oppressors or a capacity to lie – are also ones that one should morally regret having to cultivate.”10 
On the Aristotelian conception of virtue, neither anger nor a capacity to lie are virtuous. While 
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there may be conditions under which the virtuous agent knows to err on the side of anger or 
dishonesty, these conditions on their own do not make these actions virtuous. Despite this, we 
recognise that the capacity to lie can be an effective method of subversion when dealing with 
oppressors who fail to recognise their position (or, the stronger reality, oppressors who do not care 
that they are on unequal social footing). For example, a person of colour may err towards anger 
when confronting oppressive policing, yet the traditional Aristotelian conception of the virtues 
would fault this agent rather than the system they are acting within. This is one example of many 
that demonstrates how the traditional Aristotelian conception of virtue is strained when applied to 
real-life situations.  
 Another way in which this deviates from traditional Aristotelean virtue ethics lies the 
cultivated virtues themselves. Aristotle clearly noted that virtues are pleasant, never painful.11 
Anger at oppressors, the capacity to lie, sensitivity to the suffering in the world, all of these painful 
virtues are exactly this: painful virtues. In this sense, we need to redefine what constitutes a virtue 
for the person with atypical virtue, as traditional definitions will fail to account for several 
necessary virtues. However, this needs to be cautiously articulated, as such virtues must be crafted 
in a manner that does not leave the agent subject to being “characterized as too indifferent – for to 
choose a moderate level of response to great suffering is to choose to let masses of people suffer 
as a result of one’s own failure to choose a higher level of response”.12 We need to be careful of 
where the extremes are, so we can accurately determine the mean we are searching for in these 
burdensome virtues. 
With these conceptions in mind, I want to argue that an agent who has been through at least 
one tragic dilemma13 or negative circumstance is more important for successful resistance 
movements than an agent whose moral luck has led that one through a life without such events. 
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An objector may dispute this claim by asserting it makes the overcoming of oppression into a self-
defeating task. However, I want to strongly resist this cynical stance for a simple reason: it again 
assumes we are operating with ideal conditions in mind. There is no person who is completely 
without some sort of moral scarring in our world, no matter how saintly such a one may be. Often, 
we experience tragic situations and dilemmas that are entirely out of our control and these have 
profound effects on our lived experience. And if no one is wholly unscarred by negative events in 
life, then this objection fails. Those who overcome their oppressive situations will be changed by 
the experience, but they will retain afterimages of the struggle that will remain for the rest of their 
lives. 
To make my assertion clearer, I will again rely on Tessman’s definitions. She asserts that 
the existence of tragic dilemmas “show[s] that there are virtues whose exercise is, due to bad 
(including unjust or oppressive) conditions, not conducive to their bearer’s flourishing.”14 Morally 
strong agents knows that they need to come to a decision, and that this decision will inevitably 
scar their moral character. Yet, it is usually understood that deciding between two terrible choices 
is better than not deciding at all. This ‘choosing the lesser of two evils’ is sufficient for creating a 
moral blockage that disavows the traditionally virtuous life; however, this disavowal is important 
because it is these agents who make change possible. It is true that such scarred agents will incur 
repercussions on their psyche that makes full virtue impossible, but they simultaneously help 
progress society toward dismantling the oppressive regime responsible for the tragic circumstance 
in the first place.  
Those who resist, those who have cultivated these painful virtues, deal with the 
consequences of speaking out against the oppression they encounter. These consequences are 
unfortunate, and stem from what I will call the ‘mean’ of action. This follows much the same trend 
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that the virtues do; there is a mean which we must strive towards, and there are two extremes which 
arise from a deficit, and an excess, of action. As with the virtues, the extremes are not equidistant 
from the mean. The following table shows how I perceive this relationship exists: 
Deficit – Too Little of Trait Mean - Virtue Excess – Too Much of Trait 
No anger / Passive Anger towards oppressors Anger towards everyone 
Inability to lie Capacity to lie Indiscriminate lying 
Insensitive to suffering Sensitivity to suffering Disproportionately sensitive 
Deficit - No Action Mean - Action in spite of 
oppression 
Excess – Too much action / 
Action ‘just because’15 
Increased psychological harm Resistance against oppressors Increased physical harm 
 
This table is not meant to equate action with virtue per se, as to do so would be improper. The 
point of the table is to show that there is a similar relationship between the virtues and their 
extremes as there is to action and its extremes. Persons of atypical virtue can possess the mean in 
respect to the virtues, yet not in respect to action (e.g. someone who has a sensitivity to the 
suffering of others yet refuses to take any action against oppressors because this person is afraid 
of physical harm). Likewise, those who speak out against injustices can possess the mean with 
respect to action, yet not in respect to the virtues (e.g. someone who, in a situation between neo-
Nazis and people of colour, uncritically “gives both sides a fair chance”). Those who possess the 
mean in both categories are the focus of my analysis below. 
3. Mapping Painful Virtue onto Queer Canadian Protest 
 For many marginalised individuals, the life of a virtuous agent is not even a theoretical 
possibility. Even from early school years, many of these individuals are bullied, assaulted, or 
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otherwise harmed by circumstances deemed ‘normal’ by society. However, these individuals can 
develop into persons of atypical virtue, and lead resistance movements against such societal norms 
to change the social landscape for future generations. To demonstrate this assertion, I now turn to 
a case study on queer rights movements, specifically in a Canadian context.16 This discussion 
begins with the partial decriminalisation of homosexuality by the Trudeau government in 1969. 
While this federal change in the law looked inclusive, the administration of justice is something 
taken up on a provincial, and more often municipal, level. As Miriam Smith writes: 
Despite the Criminal Code change, the policing of gay sex in 
bathhouses, as well as other forms of sexual regulation, continued 
unabated […]. During the 1970s and 1980s, using other levers in the 
federal Criminal Code (including Victorian-era provisions such as 
being a ‘found-in’ in a ‘bawdy house’), police in places such as 
Montreal, Vancouver, and Toronto sought to ‘clean up’ their cities 
by arresting queers and by turning a blind eye to homophobic and 
transphobic violence in urban areas.17 
Some of the more well-known clashes between queer individuals and police include the Toronto 
bathhouse raids in 1981 and the Olympic ‘clean up’ of Montreal in 1976. Individuals affected by 
these attacks experienced a situation where no matter what option they chose, to fight the 
repression or to quietly accept it, they would be harmed. Resistance meant physical assault, and 
repression meant psychological assault.  
There is no immediately virtuous decision here, and thus purely virtuous agents would have 
been incapable of action against these raids. However, I believe the leaders of the resistance to 
these police attacks were/are persons of atypical virtue: they were in non-ideal decision-making 
conditions and had to wrestle with the negative effects any course of action would produce. 
Addressing the Olympic ‘clean up’ in the 70s, Julie Podmore writes that, “[r]aids on gay and 
lesbian commercial spaces mobilized the various activist groups in [Montreal] to form the first 
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coalition against police repression, the Comité homosexuelle anti-répression (CHAR), and 
mount[ed] some of the first major lesbian and gay demonstrations in 1976”.18 These marginalised 
individuals weighed the negative outcomes of both resistance and repression, decided that the 
community would benefit more from resistance, and acted accordingly. Such a response, despite 
the lifelong consequences for those who resisted, eventually meant that this form of repression was 
mitigated for future generations. These persons of atypical virtue were able to take upon 
themselves the burdened virtues of resistance to injustice, sensitivity to suffering, directed anger, 
etc., and use such painful virtues to make positive change for the future. This is a feat that virtuous 
agents could not have accomplished due to their unscarred lives of purely virtuous development. 
Another virtue ethicist may push against this analysis and argue that a virtuous agent could 
just as easily have taken up such social change without the risk of “scarring” their moral character. 
This is because part of being virtuous is to know how to act in the right way, at the right time, to 
the right extent, and with the right motive. If there are human rights injustices, they could argue 
that subversive action might be considered morally correct in these cases. Thus, there is no need 
to create a new category of agents. I want to challenge this reading by appealing back to tragic 
dilemmas. It is generally accepted that virtuous individuals who finds themselves in a tragic 
dilemma are irreversibly scarred to the extent that they can no longer be considered purely virtuous 
agents. This is because they are presented with situations in which, no matter what option is 
chosen, there are significant repercussions for their moral being. This is not significantly different 
from the situations I have argued above. Indeed, when virtuous agents encounter a tragic dilemma, 
their being shifts to one of atypical virtue because of the tragic dilemma itself. Thus, even if an 
objector wanted to assert that such a hypothetical virtuous agent could cause the same effect as 
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those in my analysis above, effectively this individual has become a person of atypical virtue in 
the process of non-ideal decision-making. 
4. Where Does This Leave Us?  
 What does this analysis mean for the future of resistance/social movements? I believe that 
it further justifies the ethical imperative to listen to marginalised subsets within larger marginalised 
groups, such as queer Canadians. Many who benefit from differing levels of privilege have not 
had to engage in the same kinds of non-ideal decision-making as those who fought for rights before 
our time. Those involved in resisting the ‘clean ups’ and raids successfully changed society to the 
point where current generations do not have to resist these acts of repression (at least, not on the 
same scale). This lack of experience with non-ideal decision-making is especially apparent in 
recent events, such as the Black Lives Matter protest at Toronto’s 2016 Pride Parade. In subversive 
defiance of cuts to programming funding for racialized events, such as the Southeast Asian stage, 
and to reduced hiring of non-white organisers (among other issues), Black Lives Matter organisers 
halted the flow of the yearly Parade to bring attention to this lack of diversity and inclusion within 
the queer community itself. These individuals, who are marginalised on multiple fronts, weighed 
the negative effects of carrying out such a protest and of continuing to be oppressed by mainstream 
white gay organisers. Through such deliberation, and recognising that they would be negatively 
impacted by either choice, these individuals chose to act and resist.  
 Much like the clash between police and queer individuals in the 70s and 80s, the clash 
between mainstream queer individuals and the Black Lives Matter protesters progressed to cause 
some immediate harms for the marginalised protesters. Many, predominantly white, queer 
individuals demanded the protesters apologise, effectively calling for a repression of these 
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marginalised voices. Despite this, the protesters persisted with their fight for demands which they 
hoped would drastically change the 2017 incarnation of the parade. This is a battle that traditionally 
defined virtuous agents would not have been capable of performing, as the decision to resist came 
from a place of extreme pain and injustice. In this way, the Black Lives Matter protesters are 
persons of atypical virtue, and thus must be recognised as the future of queer mobilisation in 
Canada. These leaders risk physical harm, and psychological and moral injustices, attempting to 
ensure future generations do not suffer in the same way they have.  
 However, we need to be careful not to force these leaders to shoulder the whole burden of 
resistance. It cannot be the responsibility of black Canadians to fix our institutionalised racism. 
Nor can queer individuals shoulder the responsibility for changing institutionalised homophobia, 
biphobia, or transphobia. Women, disabled individuals, the poor--it is not the job of these groups 
to fix their oppressors’ worldview. Rather, anyone who belongs to a privileged group must 
shoulder this responsibility within our own communities. The Black Lives Matter protesters have 
shown us what modern queer resistance looks like, but it is not their job to fix white communities. 
Those of us in the queer community who recognise the injustice that the rampant racism in our 
community causes need to step up and resist. We need to confront our racist uncles. We need to 
speak up when our transphobic ‘allies’ exclude our brothers and sisters from their activism. We 
need to learn from Black Lives Matter, not push our problems onto them.  
 In my paper, I have tried to show how the mainstream population needs to look towards 
persons of atypical virtue when seeking the future of resistance/rights movements. This is because 
such individuals have endured sufferings that purely virtuous agents cannot comprehend due to 
their unscarred lives. The lived experience of suffering is essential for resistance because these 
individuals viscerally know the direct effects of such oppression. Persons of atypical virtue have 
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developed virtues that are essential to effective resistance, such as directed anger, the capacity to 
lie, sensitivity to suffering, etc. While it is from negative circumstances that these individuals have 
come to cultivate such burdened virtues, and while it now means they will forever take up the 
world considering such moral pains, these individuals are the most capable of leading future 
resistance movements and dismantling the need for such virtues in future generations.19 
Endnotes
1 Consider the possible tension between friendliness and patience. To avoid the deficiency of 
cantankerousness and get the mean of friendliness, one needs to be less quick-tempered and more 
attentive. But, to avoid the deficiency of indifference and get the mean of patience, one needs to 
be less dispassionate and more quick-tempered (because patience has a limit). When properly held, 
these two virtuous means feed into one another, but if one is to deviate too far into quick-temper 
then these two can be thrown out of balance in separate directions.  
2 Aristotle, 1106b35-1107a5 [All references to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are taken from 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, revised by Lesley Brown (Toronto: OUP, 
2009): 31]. 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1108b10-1108b20 [Ross, 34]. 
4 There is also no direct method of denoting which is more vicious, the excess or the deficit. For 
courage the lesser of two evils may be in brashness, an excess, whereas in humility the lesser might 
take the form of too much modesty, a deficit. For Aristotle’s explanation, see 1109a30-1109b30 
[Ross 36]. 
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a20-1109a30 [Ross, 36]. 
6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b10-1145b20 [Ross, 119]. 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1146a10-1146a15 [Ross, 120]. 
8 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Toronto: OUP, 2005): 
95. 
9 I want to thank Sandra Tomsons for prompting me to consider whether the fact that women 
belonging to all these groups might mean that there is a reduction of oppression in each of the -
isms when progress is made in systematic sexism. While I see the reason for making such a claim, 
I want to maintain the stronger position I have articulated. To see why, consider swapping 
“oppressive sexism” and ‘”institutional ageism”. Elderly individuals belong to all the remaining 
groups. Thus, taking this line of argument means that “making progress in the institutional 
oppression of the elderly alone” would make a difference in all these other -isms. This substitution 
can be repeated for race and ability (and many others unlisted). My stronger position holds because 
we need to focus on all the -isms if we want to make significant change in any single -ism, simply 
because of how interconnected they all are. 
10 Cheshire Calhoun, “Reflections on the Metavirtue of Sensitivity to Suffering.” Hypatia 23(3): 
182. 
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1120a25-30 [Ross, 61] 
12 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 90. 
                                                          
 91 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 A tragic dilemma is an event in which an agent is presented with a choice between two terrible 
options yet must decide between them. A classic example is “Sophie’s Choice” where a mother 
must choose which one of her two children will live and which one will be killed by a random 
Nazi. If she does not make a choice, they will both die.  
14 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 111. 
15 An explanation of “action just because” might be justified here. By this I mean to reference 
those individuals who act out at every perceived injustice without first educating themselves on 
the issue(s) at hand. I say that this excess can result in physical harm because these individuals 
may not have set up precautions to mitigate the harms that may happen if their actions turn into 
riots, or if the oppressors they are protesting against suddenly turn violent. This is not to say that 
those within the mean of action, those who “act in spite of oppression”, will never be physically 
harmed. Rather it is to say that the risk of physical harm is greater in those who act “just because”. 
16 There are many different overlapping and intertwined issues I could address here. I will be 
operating on a simplified discussion; in no way is this section meant to be a comprehensive history 
of such social movements. 
17 Miriam Smith, “LGBTQ Activism: The Pan-Canadian Political Space” in Queer Mobilizations: 
Social Movement Activism and Canadian Public Policy, ed. Manon Tremblay (Toronto: UBC 
Press, 2015): 46-47. 
18 Julie Podmore, “From Contestation to Incorporation: LGBT Activism and Urban Politics in 
Montreal” in Queer Mobilizations: Social Movement Activism and Canadian Public Policy, ed. 
Manon Tremblay (Toronto: UBC Press, 2015): 189. 
19  want to thank Robert Murray, Meredith Schwartz, Jo Kornegay, and Rebecca Kovacs for their 
comments and suggestions on a previous project from which this paper was adapted. I also want 
to thank the two referees for their comments on this paper. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 2017 annual conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics, 
and I thank members of the audience for their helpful questions and suggestions. 
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